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Abstract 
The main purpose of the current paper is to examine the impact of country-level corporate 
governance (CG) and legal system, on corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) 
engagement. Our analysis tends to evaluate to which extent they have endured the global financial 
crisis (GFC), as reflected in the CSR disclosure of listed firms. The present study explores whether 
CSRD practices are similar or different in organizations from six countries and two different 
continents corresponding to two different legal systems, corporate governance systems, and 
accounting models. These factors, amongst others, may influence the disclosure policy of CSR 
information. Our results uncovered that a CSR transparency-increasing effect of country-level 
corporate governance is more pronounced for firms in the Anglo-American legal and regulatory 
environment, and less pronounced for firms in Euro-Continental institutional environment. 
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Nowadays, the success of a company is determined not only with its ability to find the best 
ways to transform inputs into products and services but also with its participation in solving 
social and environmental issues. It has become necessary for businesses to take responsibility 
for their actions. Global attention to community concerns and stakeholders’ demands has been 
witnessed since four decades ago. Firms' stakeholders started showing more interest in the way 
firms react towards the natural environment, employees, and customers.  
One way to inform the stakeholders about CSR activities is to disclose CSR information. CSR 
disclosure (CSRD) provides information to the public regarding corporate activities that relate to the 
society, such as about reducing environmental impact, improving waste management, compliance 
with environmental regulations, and efforts to protect employees. CSR information is nowadays 
associated mainly with voluntary disclosures pertaining to several social and environmental aspects 
upon which companies' activities may have an impact (Branco & de Almeida, 2007). This information 
may be qualitative or quantitative, made in financial or non-financial terms, and seek to inform or 
influence the users of the social information. 
However, lately, there has been a debate on whether the latest global financial crisis (GFC) has any 
impact on the level of CSRD made by companies in their annual reports (Dias, Rodrigues, & Craig, 
2016; Karaibrahimoğlu, 2010). 
In fact, the GFC has led to an economic recession in different countries around the world. A great 
number of economic and financial experts agree in considering the GFC to be the worst since the 
Second World War. The crisis began in the US with the burst of the subprime mortgage housing 
bubble, after governmental, supervisory and regulatory authorities undervalued the real risk of the 
situation. The effects of this GFC are wide-sweeping and all the world economies suffer the 
consequences (Fernández-Feijóo Souto, 2009). Most companies had difficulties in borrowing 
financial capital from financial institutions (Njoroge, 2009) which restricted investment procedures. 
There are numerous consequences, both for society and companies, associated with GFC. These 
include the increased unemployment rate, output collapse, lowered incomes leading to extreme 
poverty (Charitoudi, Giannarakis, & Lazarides, 2011; Dias et al., 2016; Laidroo & Sokolova, 2015). 
An important area for increased attention is the trust between companies and their stakeholders as 
the trust ''indicator index'' has decreased since before the financial crisis up until 2010 in most 
developed countries (Charitoudi, Giannarakis, and Lazarides 2011). Companies operating under this 
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financial environment hesitate to invest and be involved in CSR initiatives because of the increased 
cost (Fernández-Feijóo Souto, 2009). According to (Njoroge, 2009), multinational companies have 
been compelled by circumstances to search for ways of curbing spending including negating on 
their corporate social responsibilities. Nevertheless, little research has been done that directly 
examines the relationship between CSED and country-level CG, and still very few studies addressed 
such relationship in times of crisis (Ducassy, 2013). This is especially true in terms of CSED quality 
as opposed to the quantity of such disclosure. 
The contribution of this research to the existing literature is twofold. Most studies compare different 
countries separately, however, our study compares two contexts known by their institutional 
differences. We can observe that the quality of the institutional environment in Euro-Continental 
and Anglo-American countries is generally well-developed; but nevertheless, there is significant 
variation in contextual institutional systems that need to be tested. Secondly, this study contributes 
to the growing body of literature that points to the contingent quality of good CG prescriptions and 
their inherent trade-offs with respect to desirable corporate outcomes (Aguilera et al., 2008). Our 
study points specifically to the need for CG mechanisms to be evaluated with regard both to their 
ability to function efficiently in steady-state conditions as well to their robustness to financial 
shocks (Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar, 2005; Van Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013). 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: the second section is devoted to present the institutional 
differences that exist between the contexts subject of our study. Then, a review of the literature and 
the hypotheses development are presented in a third section, followed by the methodology and 
empirical results in the fourth section. Our paper is finished by the discussion of our study's findings 
as well as a conclusion containing the major findings, limits and recommendations for potential 
studies in the field of CSRD. 
 
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
AND EURO-CONTINENTAL CONTEXTS 
Inspired by the literature, we believe that there are some key theoretical reasons used to explain why CSRD 
vary between countries. Three major institutional differences are believed to have an impact on CSRD: legal 
systems differences, corporate governance differences, and accounting systems differences. For the purpose 




2.1 Legal Systems: Common Law Vs Code Law 
The legal systems' differences that exist between countries are considered as the origin of the 
differences in accounting systems and CG systems. Based on the literature, legal systems can be 
divided into two broad categories: Code law and Common law systems (Ben Othman & Zeghal, 
2006) 
Civil law or Code law has its origin in Roman law of Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. Under this 
influence, in the ensuing period, the civil law has been developed mostly in Continental Europe 
countries like France, Germany, and Spain. The main feature of civil law is that it is contained in 
civil codes, described as a "systematic, authoritative, and guiding statute of broad coverage (Mattei, 
Ruskola, & Gidi, 2009). It uses statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering 
legal material, and relies heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate its rules (Porta et al., 
1998). Most civil codes were adopted in the 19th and 20th centuries. Civil or Code law has three 
major principals (Schwartz, 1998): 
 The solution of each case is to be found in the provision of each law;  
 Precedents, however authoritative, are not binding; and  
 The deciding court must demonstrate that its decision is based on provisions of the written 
law, and not merely on precedents. 
On the other hand, Common law evolved in England since around the eleventh century and was 
later adopted in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other countries of the British 
Commonwealth. The most obvious distinction between civil law and common law systems is that 
civil law system is a codified system, whereas the common law is not created by means of 
legislation but is based mainly on case law. “English common law developed because landed 
aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of law that would provide strong protections for property 
and contract rights, and limit the crown’s ability to interfere in markets” (Mahoney, 2001). The 
common law historically stood on the side of private property owners against the state. Rather than 
becoming a tool of the state, the common law has acted as a powerful counterbalance that has 
promoted private property rights. Thus, the common law’s comparative emphasis on private 
property rights relative to the state tends to support financial development to a greater degree than 
the civil law (Beck, Levine, & Demirgüç-Kunt, 2002). Unlike civil law, the common law may be 
unwritten in statutes. According to De Cruz (1999), the common law is a "large body of rules 
founded on unwritten customary law evolved and developed throughout the centuries". 
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In the matter of accounting and CSRD, in civil law contexts, it is expected to find a body of codified 
disclosure laws prescribing in detail how each activity or event should be treated and disclosed. In 
this type of system, there is therefore much less need or scope for the use of professional judgment 
in preparing accounts, developing accounting practices including disclosure (Deegan & Islam, 
2009). Rather, governmental requirements are imposed on the profession and strongly influence 
disclosure practices in Euro-Continental countries. Contrarily, in common law countries we would 
expect to find relatively few detailed accounting laws guiding accounting practices, and therefore 
historically the development of accounting practices would have been left much more to the 
professional judgments of accountants (and auditors). According to (Ben Othman & Zeghal, 2006), 
since the development of common law is attributed to individual action in the private sector, rather 
than to collective or government planning in the public sector, it would naturally influence company 
law. Thus, it traditionally does not prescribe rules to cover the behavior of companies and how they 
should prepare their financial and non-financial disclosure. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Vs Shareholder Models 
Corporate governance systems around the world differ according to the most important stakeholders 
who influence the decision making process in corporations, as well as the instruments and 
mechanisms used by those stakeholders to affect the corporate governance process (Becic, 2011; 
Ortas, Gallego, Alvarez, & Etxeberria, 2015; VORONTSOV, 2016). The choice of systems also 
depends on the type of capital market which is specifically determined by the level of investors’ 
ownership concentration and power over the management. Specifically, CG systems have been 
characterized by the nature of share ownership within various national economies and the way in 
which shareholders’ influence is brought to bear in the control of the companies concerned. 
The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is most popular in the Anglo-American countries 
embracing the common law. The major focus of this model is upon shareholders. It is market-
oriented, characterized by a large and liquid stock markets, low and dispersed concentration of 
ownership, relatively high level of protection for minority shareholders, and dominant role of the 
institutional investors (Thomsen, 2003). The outsider-system is characterized by a large number of 
listed companies, the shares of which are held by a large number of (institutional) shareholders 
without close ties (Franks & Mayer, 1994). The dispersed ownership is associated with shareholder 
disinterest; as small stakes provide neither incentive nor power to influence the management of the 
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firm. This dispersed ownership structure is, in part, due to the strong presence of institutional 
investors, who work under strict diversification obligations (Dehaene & Ooghe, 1998; Van Hulle, 
1996). This shareholder passivity has the effect of handing control of the company to its 
management, thus bringing into focus the consequences of separating ownership and control 
predicted by (Berle-Means, 1932) and later explored by (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, the 
minority shareholders enjoy extreme protection thanks to the developed capital market supported by 
the legal infrastructure (Cernat, 2004). 
Conversely, the European Continental corporate governance system is typical in the European 
countries and is also known as the stakeholder system. Cernat (2004) argues that this model 
considers not only the interests of shareholders but also all stakeholders of the firm. In this CG 
system, corporate ownership is concentrated in hands of a small number of investors. Shareholder 
groups hold a large percentage of the total number of shares that are publicly traded, which allows 
them to decide on many of the problems concerning the corporation. Specifically, corporate 
ownership is typically concentrated among a stable network of strategically oriented banks and 
other industrial companies. Consequently, the market for corporate control has a lower impact on 
management than in the Anglo-Saxon system (Becic, 2011). In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model, 
at a corporate level, the employees take participation in the strategic decision-making process, 
through trade union representations or works council. European Continental model relies on internal 
control mechanisms such as directors’ remuneration, board composition and management 
performance based-reward (Lopatta, Jaeschke, & Chen, 2017; Setia-Atmaja, 2008). Banks has a 
significant impact on governing processes (Tipurić, Tušek, & Filipović, 2009). In fact, in this CG 
system, banks play the central external governance role through relational financing, providing 
financial services and monitoring in times of financial distress. Banks and industrial companies hold 
large blocks of shares in European corporations and actively participate in supervision and 
governing processes of the corporations. Block holders use their voting power to directly influence 
the way corporations are being governed and they rarely trade their shares (Jackson & Moerke, 
2008). This concentrated ownership structure enables owners to maintain the control over the 
corporation and to make decisions that enhance the profitability of the corporation instead of 





2.3 Institutional differences and CSRD 
We believe that the institutional differences explained above have impacts on disclosure practices. 
While firms in Anglo-American countries with common law origins have a wider stakeholders’ 
responsibility and therefore report accordingly, firms in countries embracing the Euro-continental 
CG model, with concentrated ownership structure, have limited stakeholder demands, thus limited 
required information (Adelopo, Obalola, & Moure, 2018). Furthermore, while Anglo-Saxon-CG-
model countries have stronger more developed property rights and shareholders’ protection laws; 
Euro-Continental countries with civil law origins seem to have more developed employees’ rights 
and protections laws (Idowu & Towler, 2004). Due to these distinctive features and their potential to 
impact on firms’ social disclosure behavior, firms in the Anglo-American context have a greater 
need to make more social disclosures than firms in the Euro-Continental context. Similarly, 
ownership structure and diverse stakeholders’ disclosure demand arguments also motivate the 
conjecture that firms in the common law countries would make more shareholder related CSED than 
those in the civil law countries.  
On the other hand, it is likely that companies belonging to the Euro-Continental context have 
incentives to make more employee-related social disclosures than those in the Anglo-American 
countries. According to Whitley (1998), the employer-employee relationship in the Anglo-
American-American context could be characterized with flexible external labor markets with a high 
rate of employment change, compared to a more intermediate relationship in the Euro-Continental 
countries. Employers in Continental Europe tend to see employees as part of the strategic strength 
and resources of the firms and are more prepared to spend on their training and development 
(Adelopo, Moure, and Obalola 2013; Esteban, Villardón, and Sánchez 2017; Amor-Esteban, García-
Sánchez, and Galindo-Villardón 2017). In fact, employees in some of these countries play more 
active roles in CG through works councils and co-determination (Idowu & Towler, 2004). 
Therefore, the level of social disclosure is expected to change across these contexts. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this study, we focus on an organizational or "open system" approach to CG as proposed by 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). This approach extends the agency-based view of CG by considering the 
contingencies and interactions of CG arrangements. Although the traditional agency-theory-based 
view of CG seeks to establish a universal link between CG practices and outcome variables 
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regardless of the organizational context, the organizational view suggests that CG practices produce 
different impacts in different contexts (Blau & Scott, 2003; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013)). 
Several studies in the literature demonstrate mixed results or indicate a negative impact of corporate 
governance on CSR disclosure (Ben Rhouma and Cormier, 2007). Different studies of the same 
governance mechanism, such as board independence, capitulate varying findings. These dissimilar 
results might be due to the contextual differences that exist between the two contexts. All things 
being equal, one reason for the mixed results of previous literature might be that these studies focus 
on specific but different institutional settings within a single country. Thus, we follow Ernstberger 
& Grüning, (2013) regarding complementarities and contingencies in CG research to examine the 
interactions between CG arrangements and regulations at the country level and assess the ways in 
which the links between CG and CSED are contingent on the legal environment of a firm.  
Previous studies have examined the determinants that explain the differences between countries in 
the extent of CSED. For example, (Williams, 1999)  suggest that culture dimensions (uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity), political and civil system, legal system, level of economic 
development, and equity market are the variables which represent the determinants of CSR 
disclosure on the country level. The results show that two cultural dimensions and political and civil 
system are significant determinants of the quantity of CSR disclosure provided by listed companies 
in these countries, While, the legal system and equity market do not appear to be important factors 
in explaining CSRD. (Buhr & Freedman, 2001) explain that the factors such as history, geography, 
the political system, the legal system, and the business climate affect the different disclosure 
responses in Canada and USA. (Chambers et al., 2003) investigated CSR disclosure in seven Asian 
countries by analyzing the impact of economic level, social development, corporate governance 
system, and globalization on the level of internet CSR disclosure. They expected that high standards 
of governance would be positively correlated with disclosure. They find no clear relationship with 
web-based CSR disclosure. (Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005) argued that stakeholder orientation in 
a country will influence the extent and quality of CSD in annual reports. They argued that corporate 
governance systems, ownership structure, and cultural factors in a country influence the manner in 
which the role of the company and its stakeholders is defined in society. Their findings based on a 
sample of 32 Norwegian/Danish companies and 26 US companies support their argument. More 
recently, (Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013) examine how a country’s regulatory environment interacts 
with firms’ institutional CG arrangements to affect the disclosure that these firms provide in their 
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annual reports. They investigate whether this effect varies with the legal environment. (Ernstberger 
& Grüning, 2013) believe that the transparency-increasing effect of strong CG might be reinforced 
by a strong legal environment, suggesting a complementary relationship between these two factors 
with respect to transparency. However, strong CG arrangements may serve as bonding mechanisms 
in weak legal environments, suggesting a substitutive relationship between CG and the regulatory 
environment. Using a sample of listed firms from 16 European countries, Ernstberger and Grüning 
(2013) find evidence suggesting that CG arrangements and the legal environment substitute with 
respect to their effects on corporate disclosure. In our study, we are interested in analyzing the 
impact of context-level CG arrangements and legal environment on CSED in the three crisis phases. 
It is argued that the interaction between legal environment, economic level, culture, and the level of 
corporate governance determine the extent of social pressure in a given country (Gutiérrez, García, 
& Cañizares, 2013; HASSAN, 2010). Thus, it might have an impact on the extent of CSED. Thus, 
companies might respond differently to this social question. In this regard, CG practices appear to 
play an important role in determining companies’ responses. In fact, CG incorporates controlling 
mechanisms and procedures to ensure that management acts in the interest of shareholders, and this 
theoretical view can be extended to include all stakeholders, not only shareholders. Thus, good CG 
practices can ensure that companies act in the interest of all stakeholders, at all times. It can be 
argued, therefore, that CG practices in a given context, determine how companies respond to social 
pressure, and consequently the extent of CSED in the context. While the impact of CG on CSED 
can matter less in normal economic situations, when a financial crisis reigns, better CG mechanisms 
become crucial to preserve a good extent (quantity and quality) of CSED. We can, therefore, 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between the context-level corporate governance, 
and the extent of CSED, in both contexts, during the GFC. 
In addition to corporate governance, country characteristics such as legal, regulatory and 
institutional frameworks, influence firms’ CSR disclosure levels. Countries with stronger legal 
environments generally demand greater transparency because a stronger legal environment restricts 
insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, thereby mitigating the incentives of those 
insiders to withhold information from the firm’s stakeholders (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). 
However, it remains unclear whether the regulatory or institutional environment influences the 
impact of firms’ CG arrangements on corporate disclosure (Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013). 
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According to Van Essan (2013), the emergence of the law and finance literature emphasizes the 
importance of country-level governance institutions. The principle idea of this literature suggests 
that countries with good governance institutions, such as the rule of law and specific legal 
regulations, will have an impact on the extent of firms' disclosures in annual reports (Hassan, 2010; 
Van Essan et al., 2013). According to Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), given that agency costs are 
likely to be high in weaker legal countries, there will be a demand in these countries for stronger CG 
to avoid information withholding and protect against expropriation. This agency cost-related 
demand for stronger corporate governance is expected to be lower in countries with stronger legal 
environments because there are already country-level investor protection mechanisms in place (Choi 
& Wong, 2007). Consequently, we believe that stronger context-level legal institutions should 
influence positively the extent of CSED during GFC.  (Baldini et al., 2018) found that country-level 
characteristics such as the legal framework, significantly affect the firms’ social and environmental 
disclosure practices. Similar results were found by (Amor-Esteban, García-Sánchez, & Galindo-
Villardón, 2017). (Coluccia, Fontana, & Solimene, 2018) also found that social, political and legal 
dimensions put forth important pressure on firms improving the transparency of corporate behavior 
especially on CSR disclosure. We also extend the traditional agency theory-based view to an 
organizational view by examining whether the impact of CG on CSED differs across legal regimes 
or remains stable. Simultaneously, we verify, if during the crisis times, these CG mechanisms 
function in the same way they do during normal times. (El-Bassiouny & El-Bassiouny, 2018) found 
that the influence of organizational-level factors including corporate governance mechanisms on 
CSRD is highly dependent on the institutional context where companies operate. Since the countries 
of both contexts that belong to our sample are known by their high level legal environment, we 
predict the following hypotheses:  
H2: There is a positive association between the context-level legal framework, and the extent 
of CSRD in both contexts, during the GFC. 
H3: The relationship between a firm’s CSRD and country-level corporate governance vary 








4. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.1 Sample selection and Research Method 
Our study is based on content analysis of the annual reports of 211 corporations belonging to the 
Euro-Continental and Anglo-American contexts. The Anglo-American sample for which complete 
data were readily available across all years of the sampling period is composed of 108 companies. 
Therefore, the Anglo-American sample, covering a period of 7 years, is based on corporations 
drawn from 3 countries and covering a wide range of industries resulting in a total of 756 firm-year 
observations. The Euro-continental sample for which complete data were readily available across all 
years of the sampling period is composed of 103 companies. Therefore, the Euro-continental 
sample, covering a period of 7 years, is based on companies drawn from 3 countries and covering a 
wide range of industries resulting in a total of 721 firm-year observations. Therefore, the whole 
study is based on 211 corporations where their annual reports were observed and treated along a 
period of 7 years which makes a total of 1477 year-observations. All the companies belonging to 
our sample have accessible websites with an investor relations sections that include electronic 
versions of the seven years’ annual reports (2005-2011) in one or more formats (including Excel, 
HTML, interactive HTML, PDF and Webcast (Video, Audio)). 
In order to capture CSED extent in the annual reports (dependent variable), we established a 
disclosure checklist (as detailed in Annex A) based on the updated version of Wiseman (1982)'s 
checklist retrieved from Cormier and Magnan (1999). This checklist assesses both the quality and 
quantity of societal disclosure in companies' annual reports. The method consists in detecting the 
presence of the information, then on rating this information. The chosen rating scale is as follows: 
"0" if no information; 
"1" if general information;  
"2" if encrypted OR detailed information; and 
"3" if detailed and encrypted information.  
This qualitative approach is inspired from the coding instrument used by (Wiseman, 1982)) and 
adapted by Cormier and Magnan (1999 and 2003) then used in other studies such as (Ben Rhouma, 
2006; Yusoff & Lehman, 2005). Thus the advantage of capturing not only the quantity of disclosure 
but also its quality. Our goal, through the creation of the checklist and its coding scale, is to 




4.2 Regression Model 
Following Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), we estimate the following multiple regression model for 
each sample, in order to evaluate the interaction of corporate governance and the legal environment 
in affecting corporate social and environmental disclosure: 
 
where: 
CSED(ij,t)= total social and environmental score of the firm j in country i in year t;  
CORPGOV(i,t)= the corporate governance index for the country i in year t, as provided in the global 
competitiveness report;  
REG(i,t) = one of the indexes for the legal environment(Rule of Law or Law and Order) in country i 
during the year t, as described above;  
SIZE(ij,t) = the natural log of the total assets of firm j of country i during year t; AGE(ij,t) = the 
number of years since the foundation of firm j in country i during year t 
INDUST(ij,t) = dummy variable: 1 if pollutant industry; 0 if otherwise 
The model contains two types of variables: quantitative and binary variables. According to (Duguet, 
2008), an econometric model can have both quantitative variables with well-defined measures as 
exogenous; it can also have dummy variables or binary variables as control variables, and models 
with endogenous dichotomies or well observable in a part of intervals and not observable in another 
part of the interval. 
The level of CG in each context (CORPGOV) will be measured by the corporate governance index, 
provided in the global competitiveness report by the World Economic Forum. 
In order to measure the impact of the overall quality of legal background institutions (REG) in 
various Euro-Continental and Anglo-American countries jurisdictions, we use two proxies: 
 Rule of Law: the law enforcement conditions in a country as a proxy for each country’s legal 
system. Following Van Essen et al. (2013) and Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), we measure 
law enforcement in terms of the Rule of Law component of the World Governance Index 
(WGI) that is provided by Kaufmann et al. (2008).  
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 Law and Order: We also use the law and order as a measure of the general law system 
quality that is obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Following Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), in our model, we include an interaction term between 
the proxies for corporate governance and the quality of the legal environment. The regression 
coefficient β3 measures the interaction of corporate governance and the legal environment with 
respect to affecting CSED: 
A non-significant regression coefficient indicates that the impact of corporate governance on 
CSED is not related to the legal environment, 
A significant positive regression coefficient indicates a complementary effect between these two 
factors, and 
A significant negative coefficient indicates a substitutive effect between these two. 
4.3 Analysis Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive results 
The results of the descriptive analysis are presented in Table 1 below. The findings indicate that 
there is an increase in the average CSR information disclosed by firms of both contexts, over the 
three crisis phases. This upsurge reflects an increase in the level of CSRD over time, where the 
maximum score of CSRD of the Anglo-American (Euro-Continental) firms increased from 101 
(111) between 2005 and 2007, to 107 (110) in between 2008-2009 and to 125 (118) between 2010 
and 2011. 








MEAN 42.42 (46.75) 43.72 (45.45) 51.08 (50.22) 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 3.61 (4.36) 8.49 (7.07) 9.90 (2.83) 
MAX 101 (111) 107 (110) 125 (118) 
MIN 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
CORPGOV 
 PRE-CRISIS CRISIS WHILE-CRISIS 
MEAN 5.43 (5.06) 5.47 (5.13) 5.35 (5.02) 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 0.28 (0.13) 0.19 (0.04) 0.14 (0.39) 
MAX 5.82 (5.58) 5.74 (5.51) 5.59 (5.39) 




 PRE-CRISIS CRISIS WHILE-CRISIS 
MEAN 1.66 (1.42) 1.70 (1.43) 1.70 (1.42) 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 0.10 (0.27) 0.10 (0.24) 0.08 (0.20) 
MAX 1.79 (1.76) 1.81 (1.72) 1.81 (1.62) 
MIN 1.53 (1.1) 1.58 (1.13) 1.61 (1.16) 
LAW_ORDER 
 PRE-CRISIS CRISIS WHILE-CRISIS 
MEAN 0.92 (0.83) 0.90 (0.83) 0.88 (0.83) 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 0.072 (0) 0.063 (0) 0.046 (0) 
MAX 1.00 (0.83) 1.00 (0.83) 0.92 (0.83) 
MIN 0.83 (0.83) 0.83 (0.83) 0.83 (0.83) 
The minimum CSR disclosure score equals zero (0) in both contexts and during the three crisis 
phases. This result reflects the fact that there are some companies of both contexts that reveal no 
interest in CSR disclosure. The small values of standard deviation for CSED during the three crisis 
phases mean that the data is not widely spread within contexts. In fact, our sample firms of both 
contexts belong to countries that are well known of their high level of CSR awareness, reflected on 
the extent of CSR information disclosed in their annual reports. Previous CSR disclosure studies on 
these countries (USA, UK, CANADA, FRANCE, SPAIN, and GERMANY) show a high level of 
CSR information disclosed by companies not only in their annual reports but also in stand-alone 
reports as well. Other studies on the country-level determinants of CSED including countries with 
different development level, found large values of standard deviation, reflecting the noticeable 
differences in the level of CSR disclosure among these different countries. 
With regard to the corporate governance variable (CORPGOV), it is stable over the three crisis 
phases. The minimum score of CORPGOV in the Anglo-American (Euro-Continental) context over 
three phases (5.10 (4.77), 5.30 (4.66), 5.19 (4.49)) is considered a mean score for governance level. 
The average corporate governance score also indicates, in general, a high level of corporate 
governance in both contexts. The low values of standard deviation reflect that the corporate 
governance score is normally distributed (Hassan, 2010). With regard to the legal system 
dimensions (LAW_ORDER, RULE_LAW), the results show strong legal environment in both 
contexts. According to (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009) the values of RULE of LAW range 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. A higher score for the 
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Rule of law implies more confidence in the legal system. Thus, the mean values of RULE_LAW of 
both contexts show strong and solid legal and governance systems. Similarly, the standard deviation 
is very law, reflecting a similarity in the legal environment within contexts. The values of 
LAW_ORDER also reveal a consistency of the regulatory environment in both contexts. 






MIN MAX Skewness 
SIZE 6.41 (5.86) 6.24 (3.01) 4.5 (4.33) 8.85 (7.96) 0.44  (0.72) 
AGE 29.56 (31.05) 13.97 (10.22) 7 (10) 94 (77) -2.05  (1.06) 
Binary 
Variables 
YES NO YES (%) Skewness 
INDUST 75 (58) 33 (45) 69.44 (56.31) 0.59  (3.16) 
The results of table 2 show that the presented data are not normally distributed. It is observed that 
the standard skewness of AGE in the Anglo-American sample exceeds the range of ±1.96 
evidencing that the normality of the data (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Similarly, Concerning the 
Euro-Continental data, the results show that they are not normally distributed as well. In fact, the 
skewness of INDUST is 3.16 which exceed the normality range of ±1.96. Thus, a robust analysis is 
necessary. 
4.3.2 Correlation Results 
As multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and auto-correlation may also be threats to the validity and 
reliability of regression results, these are examined as part of the estimating procedures. The results 
presented in table 3 below show no significant multicollinearity between the variables of both 
models. 















     
LAW_ORDER 0.5574 
(0.4255) 



































Table 4 presents the results of Breusch-Pagan and Durbin-Watson tests. The Breusch Pagan test of 
heteroscedasticity indicates that Euro-Continental model rejects the heteroscedasticity assumption 
(p-value = 0.0251<0.05); however, the Anglo-American model confirmed the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals (p-value = 0.1536>0.05). Lastly, the Durbin-Watson test of auto-
correlation indicates that both Euro-Continental and Anglo-American-American models present a 
problem of auto-correlation (respectively, p-value = 0.0211<0.05; p-value = 0.0384<0.05). 
Accordingly, robust standard errors are used during the analysis of both models. 
 
Table 4. Breusch-Pagan and Durbin-Watson tests results of the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental models 
 











Prob> Chi2 0.1536 
 
Euro-








Prob> Chi2 0.0251 
 
4.3.3 Specification and Hausman tests 
Our study is based on structured panel data. This structure combines temporal and individual 
dimensions. In the following, the first thing to be verified is the uniform specification of the data 
generating process, which is distinguishing between the specific effects and common effects. Thus, 
consideration needs to be given as to which panel data method is more appropriate: heterogeneous 















Under the assumption that the ε(ij,t) are independently normally distributed over i, j and t with mean 
zero and variance  1,108j ,2   for the Anglo-American model, and  1,103j ,
2  for the Euro-
Continental  model, we use the F statistic. 
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If the probability of accepting the null hypothesis of equality of the constants is less than 0.05 in this 
case, we have a specific effects model. If the probability of accepting the null hypothesis of equality 
of the constants, is greater than 0.05, then, we have a common effect model (absence of individual 
effects). The results are presented in table 5 below. 





By performing the specification tests on each model, the results show that the p-values are lower 
than the significance level of 0.05, thus we reject the null hypothesis of equality of constants. This 
indicates that there exist individual specific effects.  It is now necessary to find out the type of these 
individual effects. To answer this question, we use the statistical test most used in the case of panel 
data that is of (Hausman, 1978). It allows us to discriminate between the fixed effects (Within 
estimate) and random (GLS estimate). It allows us to test the presence or absence of correlations 
between the independent variables and the individual effects. Results of the Housman test are 
presented in table 6 below. 
Table 6.  Results of Hausman test 
Hausman Test 
Models Chi-square statistic Prob>Chi2 Result 
Anglo-American  11.0563 0.6056 Random Effects 
Euro-Continental   9.5628 0.5299 Random Effects 
The results of Hausman test for both models, show that the p-values is greater than 0.05. Thus, we use 
the random effects for both models.  Since our data is not normally distributed, and have issues of 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation, we apply Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with robust 
standard error method. 
4.4 Panel Regression Analysis Results 
Table 7 reports the results of GLS regression with robust standard errors to estimate our theoretical 
model on both samples. In our analysis, we follow Ernstberger and Grüning (2013). The two columns 
in each crisis phase indicate the results for different proxies of the regulatory environment (REG). In 







F Statistic p-value F Statistic p-value 
Anglo-American  1.056*** 0.0024 2.0251 0.6214 
Euro-Continental   2.982** 0.0041 2.3698 0.4785 
***= p < 0.01; **= p < 0.05; *= p<0.1 
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property rights and investors protection. In the second column of the results, REG is proxied by 
LAW_ORDER, which is a country’s general law system quality. In the pre-crisis phase, our results 
reveal a significant positive association between CORPGOV and CSED in the Euro-Continental 
context (0.35**; 0.26***). Contrarily, CORPGOV is negatively associated with CSED in the Anglo-
American context (-0.43***; -0.18**). Similar results were found in the crisis-peak and while-crisis 
phases. Thus, with regard to hypothesis H1 that indicates a positive association between corporate 
governance and social and environmental disclosure during the GFC, regression results provide 
evidence to accept this hypothesis for the Euro-Continental context and reject it for the Anglo-
American context. 
Regarding the legal and regulatory environment, we used two proxies: Rule of Law as for property 
rights and investors' protection; and Law and Order as a proxy of law system quality. Our results reveal 
that the Rule of Law (RULE_LAW) is significantly (5%) and negatively associated with CSED in the 
Euro-Continental model (-0.41**), while it is positively and significantly (1%) correlated with CSED 
in the Anglo-American context (0.49***). Our results also show that, in both samples, LAW_ORDER 
(general quality of law system) is negatively correlated to the extent of CSED, which implies that the 
quantity and quality of CSR disclosure decrease when the quality of a country's law system is of good 
quality. This negative association was documented during the pre-crisis phase for both samples. 
 
Table 7  Results of the GLS panel regression with robust standard error 
Variables CONTEXT Pres-crisis Crisis-peak While-crisis 
RULE_LAW LAW_ORDER RULE_LAW LAW_ORDER RULE_LAW LAW_ORDER 
CORPGOV ANG -0.43*** -0.18** -0.45*** -0.42** -0.32*** -0.34*** 
(0.045) (0.048) (0.000) (0.014) (0.061) (0.053) 
EUR 0.35** 0.26*** 0.41** 0.58*** 0.24* 0.35*** 
(0.088) (0.061) (0.064) (0.079) (0.048) (0.069) 
REG ANG 0.49*** -0.33* 0.78*** 0.85* 0.78*** 0.51* 
(0.001) (0.084) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.062) 
EUR -0.88** -1.25** -0.90*** -1.02* -0.89** -1.88* 
(0.034) (0.054) (0.000) (0.067) (0.022) (0.084) 
CORPGOV.REG ANG 0.16*** 0.10* 0.24*** 0.42** 0.33*** 0.38** 
(0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.046) (0.001) (0.044) 
EUR -0.15** -0.11* -0.21** -0.56*** -0.10** -0.48** 
(0.02) (0.012) (0.031) (0.002) (0.066) (0.063) 
SIZE ANG 4.06*** 4.15*** 3.22** 4.03** 3.57** 3.25** 
(0.009) (0.000) (0.022) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036) 
EUR 3.44** 3.06** 3.69* 2.55* 3.01* 2.86* 
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(0.048) (0.037) (0.069) (0.084) (0.054) (0.087) 
AGE ANG 2.56 2.51 1.65 1.305 1.84* 1.43* 
(0.482) (0.412) (0.205) (0.127) (0.122) (0.258) 
EUR  1.09  1.26 1.22* 2.09* 1.28* 2.32* 
(0.622) (0.154) (0.07) (0.084) (0.054) (0.068) 
INDUST ANG 0.226** 0.245** 0.304** 0.331** 0.409** 0.381** 
(0.012) (0.031) (0.046) (0.035) (0.044) (0.046) 
EUR 0.125** 0.158** 0.181** 0.195** 0.164** 0.157** 
(0.022) (0.035) (0.031) (0.045) (0.028) (0.029) 
Anglo-
American 
Adj. R2 23.8 % 20.4% 49.5%  35.2% 45.6%  29.01% 
F  12.32*** 10.56** 14.55**  12.9** 15.99** 16.3** 
Euro-
Continental  
Adj.  R2 28.2% 32.2% 36.8% 41.02% 38.4% 46.1% 
F  13.5** 9.66** 5.91** 11.08% 10.23*** 11.36** 
***= p < 0.01; **= p < 0.05; *= p<0.1. CSED(ij,t)= total social and environmental score of the firm j in country i in year t; 
CORPGOV(i,t)= the corporate governance index for the country i in year t, as provided in the global competitiveness report;  
REG(i,t) = one of the indexes for the legal environment(Rule of Law or Law and Order) in country i during the year t, as 
described above; SIZE(ij,t) = the natural log of the total assets of firm j of country i during year t; AGE(ij,t) = the number of 
years since creation of firm j in country i during year tINDUST(ij,t) = dummy variable: 1 if pollutant industry; 0 if otherwise 
 
 
Contrarily, in the crisis-peak phase, we find that the general quality of the legal system of the 
Anglo-American context, operationalized by LAW_ORDER, is found positively related to CSED. 
However, it remained significantly and negatively correlated to CSED in the Euro-Continental, 
although this significance is weaker in this phase than in the pre-crisis phase. This result implies that 
a high-quality law system is beneficial in crisis conditions in Anglo-American countries. During the 
while-crisis phase, the association between CSED and LAW_ORDER remained positive for the 
Anglo-American context and negative for the Euro-Continental context. 
Thus, H2 is accepted for the Euro-Continental context, and confirmed for the Anglo-American-
American context. Moving to the interaction of corporate governance and the legal environment 
(CORPGOV.REG) with respect to affecting CSED.  
 REG = RULE_LAW: 
Pre-crisis phase: For the Euro-Continental context, CORPGOV.REG is significantly negative (-
0.015**), indicating that the impact of country-level corporate governance on CSED is higher when 
the respect of property rights and investors’ protection is weak. According to Ernstberger and 
Grüning (2013), the sign of this coefficient indicates a substitutive relationship between country-
level governance and the regulatory environment with respect to affecting corporate disclosure. 
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However, CORPGOV.REG is significantly positive (0.16***) in the Anglo-American model. This 
result indicates that, unlike in the Euro-Continental context, the impact of country-level corporate 
governance of Anglo-American context countries on CSED is higher when the respect of property 
rights and investors protection is strong. These findings support the previous results we found 
(H9a). Thus, one can infer that there is a complementary effect between the level of CG in a country 
and its investors protection measures, with respect to the impact of CSR disclosure, in the Anglo-
American context. 
Crisis-peak and While-crisis phases: The association between CORPGOV.REG and CSED in the 
Euro-Continental model remains negative. This result implies that superior measures of investors 
protection, do not have a positive impact on CSED during the GFC, and the years right after the 
crisis, however, it provides evidence for a substitutive interaction between the measures of investors 
protection and corporate governance with respect to the effects of these factors on CSED. Regarding 
the Anglo-American context, the interaction between the two variables is still significantly positive 
(0.24***; 0.33***). The coefficient of the interaction term again provides evidence for a 
complementarity interaction between the investors' protection measures and corporate governance 
level of a context with respect to the effects of these factors on CSR disclosure. This 
complementarity interaction remains unchanged across the three crisis phases. 
REG = LAW_ORDER: 
Pre-crisis phase: For the Euro-Continental model, CORPGOV.REG is also negative and 
significant at the level of 10%, although this significance is weaker than in the RULE_LAW model. 
This result implies that the respect of investors' protection measures in a country better describes the 
CSR disclosures than the quality of the general law system. Regarding the Anglo-American model, 
CORPGOV.REG is also found positively correlated to the extent of CSED at the level of 10%. 
Crisis-peak and While-crisis phases: the association between the quality of the law system and 
CSED is found negative in the Euro-Continental model and positive in the Anglo-American model. 
However, the significance of both coefficients is stronger than it is in the pre-crisis phase 
(respectively 1% and 5%). Based on the results above, H3 is accepted for the Euro-Continental 
context, and confirmed for the Anglo-American context. 
The results of GLS regression also reveal a significant positive relationship between CSED and 
corporate characteristics including company size and industry. However, the analysis shows that 
firm age (AGE) in both contexts, is statistically insignificant in correlation with CSR disclosure, 
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during the pre-crisis phase. This result reveals that the amplified awareness on the importance of 
CSR to be part of a firm's strategic plan, seem to increase over time, and young entrepreneurs seem 
to incorporate CSR within the strategy of their new young corporations. However, during the crisis-
peak phase AGE is found positive and significant at the level of 10% in the Euro-Continental 
model, while it remains insignificant in the Anglo- American model. Things change in the while-
crisis phase, when AGE is found positive and significant in both contexts. Such result implies that 
during the GFC, and the years right after the age of a firm (which is a proxy for its experience) is 
beneficial regarding the transparency of CSR information disclosed by companies in their annual 
reports. 
5. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the impact of country-level CG, legal environment, 
and the interaction in-between, on CSRD during the GFC. Specifically, we are interested in finding 
evidence of either convergence or divergence of CSRD practices between the Euro-Continental and 
Anglo-American contexts, during the GFC. In order to achieve this objective, this paper examines 
the effects of context-level CG on CSED before, during and while the GFC. The contexts of our 
study represent a diverse sample of cultures, socio-political, legal and accounting systems. 
In the pre-crisis phase, our results reveal a significant positive association between CORPGOV and 
CSED in the Euro-Continental context. Thus, more governance mechanisms provided by Euro-
Continental companies will improve internal control and consequently increase the level of CSR 
disclosure, to reduce information asymmetry (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Ho & Wong, 2001; 
Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008). Contrarily, CORPGOV is negatively associated with CSED in the 
Anglo-American context. According to Hassan (2010), this negative association between corporate 
governance and CSED could imply that there is no role for companies’ responses in determining the 
level of disclosure in a country. Thus, the level of CSR disclosure is determined according to the 
degree of social pressure on companies, with regard to their social responsibility (Hassan, 2010), not 
to the level of CG of the country to which they belong. The degree of social pressure in a country 
will be determined according to the economic level and cultural values of that country. According to 
Ho and Wong (2001), additional governance mechanisms will lead to greater monitoring, and the 
need for disclosure as a form of monitoring, would then diminish. Our results reveal that the Rule of 
Law (RULE_LAW) is negatively associated with CSED in the Euro-Continental model, while it is 
positively and significantly correlated with CSED in the Anglo-American context. Such result is not 
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surprising since Anglo-American countries have stronger developed property rights and 
shareholders’ protection laws, like all common law countries, more than civil law (Euro-
Continental) countries. Thus, Anglo-American countries have a greater need to make more CSR 
disclosures than firms in Euro-Continental countries due to their diverse stakeholders’ disclosure 
demands. The negative association documented in the Euro-Continental context especially in the 
crisis-peak phase suggests that continuing to increase in investors' protection may be subject to 
decreasing societal disclosure. 
Our results also show that, in both samples, LAW_ORDER is negatively correlated to the extent of 
CSED, which implies that the quantity and quality of CSR disclosure decrease when the quality of a 
country's law system is better. This negative association was documented in all crisis phases. 
Consequently, we infer that the quality of legal and regulatory environment is beneficial in both 
steady-state (normal) and crisis times, and in financial adversity is consistent with research that 
suggests the primary institutional advantage of advanced economies, such as those comprising the 
countries of our samples, resides in the quality of a jurisdiction’s legal framework (Ernstberger and 
Grüning, 2013). Regarding the interaction of corporate governance and the legal environment 
(CORPGOV.REG) with respect to affecting CSED, our results reveal a significant negative 
association in the Euro-Continental model. This result indicates that the impact of country-level 
corporate governance on CSED is higher when the respect of property rights, investors protection 
and general law system quality, is weak. Thus there is a substitutive relationship between country-
level governance and the regulatory environment with respect to affecting CSED (Ernstberger and 
Grüning, 2013). Regarding the Anglo-American model, CORPGOV.REG is found significant and 
positively correlated to the extent of CSED. Such a result provides evidence that country-level 
governance and the regulatory environment complete one another, with respect to affecting CSED 
in the Anglo-American firms' annual reports. Thus, Anglo-American firms use CSR disclosure as a 
bonding mechanism in strong legal environments (Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013). Accordingly, we 
conclude that a CSR transparency-increasing effect of country-level corporate governance is more 
pronounced for firms in Anglo-American legal and regulatory environment, and less pronounced for 
firms in Euro-Continental institutional environment. By and large, the link between country-level 
CG and CSED is not universal; instead, it varies with the legal environment of the firm (Ernstberger 
and Grüning, 2013). Regarding corporate characteristics, firm size and industry type are found as 
significant determinants of social and environmental disclosure in steady-state and crisis conditions. 
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However, the age of a firm is found to be more significant in the years of crisis-peak and while the 
crisis. In fact, large companies that can afford additional costs of providing societal disclosure, tend 
to employ highly-skilled calibers and expertise and have sophisticated reporting systems to provide 
comprehensive disclosures. Thanks to their resources, they can keep a high level of CSR disclosure 
even in times of financial distress. Similarly, according to the stakeholder theory, companies 
operating in environmentally-sensitive industries are more likely to disclose information about their 
environmental performance. In addition, they are under stakeholders' pressure for more social and 
environmental information as a means of addressing their societal concerns. Even during the GFC, 
these demands might get louder especially when these firms try to focus more on their financial 
matters. The age of a company is found not linked to the extent of CSED in both contexts during the 
pre-crisis phase. However, this association turned out to be more significant during the crisis-peak 
and while-crisis phases. In fact, during the GFC, older firms try to maintain their good level of 
reputation and show their care about social and environmental matters via extensive disclosures. 
Consequently, these older firms prove they reached the point of "CSR maturity", and even in times 
of crisis, their beliefs on the importance of CSR remain unchanged, and are translated into more 
disclosures. These results show that the traditional determinants of CSED are not universal; they 
rather change across time and space. 
Like every work, our study has a number of limitations. In our analysis, we did not consider CSR 
information included in the stand-alone reports and just focused on annual reports. Nowadays, 
separate CSR reports include more detailed information on social and environmental activities that 
are certified by independent auditors. Furthermore, there might have been content analysis issues 
associated with the level of subjectivity involved in the coding process. Not to mention that the data 
was extracted manually from the firms' annual reports (almost 1400 reports), which increases the 
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Annex .A1 Environmental Disclosure Checklist (41 items) 
Economic factors: 
 Past and present equipment investments in pollution control  
 Costs of past and present operating equipment for pollution control  
 Estimated investment in equipment for pollution control  
 Estimated future operating costs for pollution control  
 Funding for equipment for pollution control  
 Environmental Debts 
 Provision for pollution risk  
 Provision for litigation  
 Provision for expenses (eg rehabilitation facilities.) 
Laws and Regulations  
 Litigation (actual and potential)  
 Fines  
 Orders to comply  
 Corrective Actions  
 incidents  
 Future legislation or future regulations 
Pollution standards:  
 Emission of air pollutants  
 Spills  
 Solid Waste Management  
 Control of installation and process 
 Compliance  
 Noise and odors 
Sustainable Development:  
 Conservation of natural resources  
 Recycling  
 Information on the protection of fauna and flora 
Site Restoration:  
 Sites  
 Efforts rehabilitation (current and potential)  
 Potential liability related to the restoration  
 Spills:  
- Number  
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- Nature  
- Reduction Efforts  
- Debts (current and potential) 
Environmental management:  
 Environmental policies and awareness of the company for the environment  
 Environmental Management System  
 Environmental Audits  
 Goals and Targets  
 Awards 
 Department, group, service affected to the environment 
 ISO 14000  
 Involvement of the firm in the development of environmental standards 
 Involvement in environmental organizations (e.g. industry committees) 



























Annex A2 Social Disclosure Checklist (36 items) 
Community involvement: 
 Community programs (health & education) 
 Canteen, Transportation, and crèches for the employees’ children 
 Charitable donations / sponsorships  
 Donations to the charity, arts, sports, etc  
 Establishment of Educational Institution (s) 
 Medical Establishments 
 Rehabilitation Programs 
 Relations with local population  
 Social welfare  
 Seminars and conferences  
 Parks and Gardens  
 Participation in government social campaigns 
 Political donations 
 Public Hall and/or Auditorium 
Human resource: 
 Accident information /statistics/Time lost to injuries 
 Consultation with employee 
 Company’s relationship with trade unions 
 Discussion of employee welfare 
 Employment of disabled and minority groups 
 Employee training in organization's ethical issue and anti corruption policies 
 Holiday, vacation or recreation activities for employees 
 Information for Day Care, maternity leave etc 
 Information regarding employee workplace health & safety 
 Profit sharing / bonus scheme policy 
 Provision of training to employee 
 Reduction or elimination of pollutants, irritants, or hazards in the work environment 
 Sponsoring educational conferences, seminars or art exhibitions 
Customer Disclosure: 
 Who are the major customers 
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 Improvement to customer service 
 Customer awards/ratings received 
 Customer health, safety or security 
Product Or Service Disclosure: 
 Discussion of major types of products/activities 
 Product Safety 
 Quality certification for product (ISO)/product related activities  
 Research projects set up by the company to improve its product/ service in any way 
 Safety of the company’s product 
 
